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States routinely engage in intelligence activities, as generally under-
stood to mean gathering information for national security, military, or
police purposes, often in a covert manner and with questionable effec-
tiveness of legislative attention and control.' Yet even acts that receive
* Former Director, International Agreements and Policy, German Federal Ministry of
Defense; Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War. The
author would like to express his gratitude to J. Timothy Weil Harrington and W. Kyle Walther
for excellent research assistance and helpful comments on an earlier draft. All views and opin-
ions are personal.
1. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Non-
forcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989) (discussing the United
States' view); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Covert Operations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 795, 805 (1989).
Congress has opted to be the silent partner. It has deliberately decided to be in-
volved remotely, partially, through a select few of its members who may offer
advice but have few means to change a presidential decision. Congress might have
chosen differently; it might some day in the future be pressed to greater involve-
ment.
Id.
By contrast, the following information used to be in the CIA Factbook on Intelligence:
Following allegations of wrongdoing by U.S. intelligence agencies, the Senate es-
tablished the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on 19 May 1976. The
House of Representatives followed suit on 14 July 1977 by creating the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). These committees, along
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legislative approval may be unlawful. In international relations certain
rules and restrictions cannot be set aside. Even if governments tend to
portray situations as emergencies and emphasize the need to take extra-
legal measures in "ticking time-bomb" scenarios, serious breaches of
law must have legal consequences in the interest of public welfare and
the protection of individual victims. It is the purpose of this contribution
to examine relevant norms and principles for assessing acts of intelli-
gence gathering under international law (Part I), evaluate legal problems
of attribution of such acts (Part II), and, where governments commit
wrongful acts, look into circumstances precluding their wrongfulness
(Part III). Based on these considerations, legal consequences for criminal
accountability (Part IV) and reparation (Part V) will be discussed. Fi-
nally, some conclusions may be drawn (Part VI).
I. WHEN IS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ILLEGAL?
No general norm exists in international law expressly prohibiting or
limiting acts of intelligence gathering. On the contrary, even in the case
of espionage-a "consciously deceitful collection of information, or-
dered by a government.., accomplished by humans unauthorized by the
with the Armed Services as well as the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs
Committees, were charged with authorizing the programs of the intelligence agen-
cies and overseeing their activities. The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act established
the current oversight structure by making SSCI and HPSCI the only two oversight
committees for the CIA. The Appropriations committees, given their constitutional
role to appropriate funds for all U.S. Government activities, also exercise some
oversight functions. In addition, the CIA interacts closely with other committees,
depending on issues and jurisdiction. The Office of Congressional Affairs in CIA
deals directly with oversight issues. SSCI and HPSCI receive over 2,200 CIA fin-
ished intelligence products annually. Moreover, CIA officials and analysts provide
more than 1,200 substantive briefings a year to members of Congress, congres-
sional committees, and their staffs. In addition, the Office of Congressional Affairs
provides annually an average of 150 notifications to our oversight committees; re-
sponds to approximately 275 Committee Directed Actions, including preparation of
Annual Reports; and prepares responses to nearly 500 oral and written inquiries.
With input from other agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC), the Office of
Congressional Affairs prepares the annual draft of the Intelligence Authorization
Act; monitors all new legislation introduced to determine the potential impact on
the Intelligcncc Community and its activities; and seeks legislative provisions
needed by the CIA and the IC (with concurrence of the Administration). A review of
the Congressional Record and other sources for Congressional legislative activities
of interest to CIA is conducted daily.
OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FACTBOOK ON INTELLIGENCE
(2003). The Factbook on Intelligence is currently being revised and is unavailable from the




target to do the collection" 2-spies receive a certain minimum protection
under the law of armed conflict. The 1907 Hague Regulations Respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land confirm that the employment
of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy are
generally permissible. Belligerent espionage is not a violation of the
laws of war. For purposes of national punishment, a person can only be
considered a spy "when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he
obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a
belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.'"
4
The Regulations expressly require trials before punishment,5 and they
even exclude criminal prosecution for previous acts of espionage of spies
who, after rejoining the army to which they belong, are subsequently
captured by the enemy.6 The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) reaffirms these principles and
extends them to residents of occupied territory.7
Yet acts of intelligence gathering committed by civilians in an armed
conflict during a concrete and coordinated military operation would not
be protected by the laws of war and would be objects of legitimate at-
tack, if these civilians' actions amounted to direct participation in
hostilities. This applies, for instance, to transmission of tactical intelli-
gence to attacking forces or instruction and assistance given to troops
with regard to the execution of a concrete military operation. Conversely,
activities that may support the conduct of hostilities but fall short of par-
ticipation in a concrete and coordinated military operation would not
deprive these civilians of legal protection against attack.
The late Richard Baxter provides the classical answer to the question
of whether espionage is legally, or at least morally or politically,
prohibited. He states there is "virtual unanimity of opinion that while the
morality of espionage may vary from case to case, some, and probably
all, spies [in an armed conflict] do not violate international law. A
2. Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Ap-
proach, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2004) (quoting Lt. Col. Geoffery B. Demarest,
Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 325-26 (1996)).
3. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex: Regu-
lations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 24, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277.
4. Id. art. 29.
5. Id. art. 30.
6. id. art. 31.
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 46, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 563 (Yves Sandoz, Christo-
phe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987).
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distinction may, of course, be made with respect to espionage other than
in time of war, for such conduct is of doubtful compatibility with the
requirements of law governing the peaceful intercourse of states."' The
fact that no explicit treaty norms address peacetime espionage is
paradoxical in light of the enormous amount of intelligence activities
and their relevance for international relations between states. The
question of the legality of peacetime espionage has no easy answer. In
the recent past, many arguments for the legality of certain acts of
intelligence gathering arose in the context of East-West confrontation
during the Cold War, for instance outside an armed conflict when
peaceful cooperation was largely unrealistic.9 Today, such arguments are
not altogether unattractive. Yet in the present world of complex
interdependencies, another approach should be taken. Strict adherence to
the dichotomy between war and peace would be ineffective and
counterproductive for establishing peace and security. Also, the
revolution in the transparent flow of information during recent decades
has diminished the relevance of covert action and clandestine methods to
the security intelligence function. Secret sources today are in constant
competition with publicly available information, and they are often less
reliable.
The need to improve the effectiveness of intelligence gathering given
existing terrorist threats has led to increased international cooperation
under increasingly transparent procedures." At the same time, the need
8. Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 323, 329 (1951). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942), stated that spies were "offenders against the law of war subject
to trial and punishment by military tribunals" for the "acts which render their belligerency
unlawful." Baxter criticized this analysis in the following terms:
There is reason to suppose ... that [the Supreme Court] was led by the somewhat
imprecise distinction often made between "lawful" and "unlawful" combatants to
conclude that failure to qualify as a lawful combatant could be described as a viola-
tion of international law. If, indeed, the Court was proceeding on the assumption
that the law of nations forbids the employment of spies and espionage itself, that
view, it is submitted, fails to find support in contemporary doctrine regarding such
activities in wartime.
Baxter, supra at 331.
9. See Jonathan E. Colby, The Developing International Law on Gathering and Shar-
ing Security Intelligence, I YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 49 (1974).
10. See Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 284 (1992); Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, AM. INTELLI-
GENCE J., Autumn/Winter 1992-93, at 75; Demarest, supra note 2, at 345.
11. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). See also U.N.
Sec. Council, Counter-Terrorism Comm., Country Reports, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/
countryreports.shtml (collecting national reports submitted to the UN Security Council




to augment professional support for better intelligence evaluation is evi-
dent. Where states have restructured national intelligence services in the
course of such activities, the transparency requirements of national
courts raise difficult questions.'2
Seen in this context, covert operations might pose more problems
than solutions. Furthermore, intelligence operations have revealed new
areas in which the law appears inadequate. Activities that fall within the
category of "information warfare"-such as spreading false information
or even sabotaging computer networks-are one example. Some even
claim such activities change the rules governing military operations in
armed conflict 3 and also affect international relations in peacetime.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not taken a position on
the issue of peacetime espionage, although it has had the opportunity to
do so on a few occasions. In the Teheran Hostages case the Iranian For-
eign Minister referred to alleged espionage and interference in Iran by
the United States in its embassy in Teheran. The Court did not accept
this as a justification for Iran's conduct, and thus it failed as a defense to
the United States' claims "because diplomatic law itself provides the
necessary means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities by
members of diplomatic or consular missions."'' 4 As the Court explained,
"means" under diplomatic law could include "that a diplomatic agent
caught in the act of committing an assault or other offence" may, "on
occasion, be briefly arrested by the police of the receiving State in order
to prevent the commission of the particular crime."'5 Problematic for Iran
was that it "did not ... employ the remedies placed at its disposal by
diplomatic law."' 6 In the Nicaragua case, 7 close logistics, intelligence,
and material support by the United States to the contras was central to
the Nicaraguan claims. The Court drew attention to the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration, which mandates that "no State shall organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities
directed towards the violent overthrow of the r6gime of another State, or
12. See, e.g., PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING
WITHOUT WAR 171-78 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Mark Russell Shulman, Legal Constraints on Information Warfare (Ctr.
for Strategy and Tech., Air Univ., Occasional Paper No. 7, Mar. 1999); Symposium on Com-
puter Network Attack and International Law, 76 INT'L L. STUD. (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian
T. O'Donnell eds., 2002).




17. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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interfere in civil strife of another State."' 8 It even emphasized the impor-
tance of this declaration and the fact that the United States actively
supported its development and adoption.' 9 The judgment of the Court,
however, concentrated on the threat or use of force as well as on viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, and it did not endorse
Nicaragua's view of subversive activities by the United States as indirect
means of coercion and intimidation.0
Legal scholars often take a fatalist position on the phenomenon of
intelligence gathering. They mostly conclude that covert action must be
taken for granted. Some even try to deny state responsibility in this con-
text, relying on the fact that spies are not official agents of states for the
purpose of international relations, and indeed, if they are caught abroad,
the capturing state can severely punish and expel them.2 ' This denial of
state responsibility may meet realistic expectations in an imperfect
world, as a spy is concealing his or her activity as an agent of a state. Yet
peacetime rules of international law may be seen as including an implicit
prohibition on subversive activities, as reflected in the Friendly Relations
Declaration. Such an understanding may be based on the principle of
nonintervention in the political independence of any other state and its
internal affairs, which includes a prohibition on "indirect or subversive
intervention involving secret activity," if "a jungle world which places a
premium on skills in subversion, infiltration, espionage, guerrilla war-
fare, nibbling aggression, and other forms of intervention" is to be
avoided. The illegality of covert action may also have other bases, such
as unauthorized entry into a foreign state's airspace or territory,23 illegal
exercise of jurisdiction on foreign territory, attempts to destabilize the
18. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
19. For the negotiating history of this language, see Report of the Special Comm. on
Principles of Int'l Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, at
161, U.N. Doc. A/6799 (Sept. 26, 1967).
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 123, 136-40.
21. Compare 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 455 (H. Lauter-
pacht ed., 8th ed. 1955 (stating "all States constantly or occasionally send spies abroad" and
"it is not considered wrong morally, politically, or legally to do so"), with 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 569 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992) (omitting the statement made in the previous edition).
22. Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine on Non-Intervention in internal Af-
fairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 13, 25 (Roland J. Stanger ed.,
1962).
23. Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 849
(1960); WOLF-WERNER LANGKAU, VOLKER- UND LANDESRECHTLICHE PROBLEME DER
KRIEGS- UND FRIEDENSSPIONAGE: UNTER BESONDERER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DER AUSSPHUNG
AUS DEM LuFr-, SEE- UND WELTRAUM 231-41 (1970).
[Vol. 28:687
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government of another state," and common crimes, such as bribery,
blackmail, unlawful entry into residences, or a breach of data protection
laws committed in the course of such acts.25 Such activities can never be
justified under customary law because they are gross violations of com-
monly accepted legal principles. The fact that they are committed
through clandestine action offers a strong argument against the existence
of any alleged opinio juris covering such conduct in international rela-
tions between states. Hence it is unacceptable to conclude, as many have,
that legal arguments can neither condemn nor justify covert action in
peacetime. The opposite is true, and among the various legal disciplines
involved in any thorough assessment, international law has an important
role to play. Legal arguments may not only support prohibitions or limi-
tations of certain activities of intelligence gathering, they may also
advocate for self-restraint in the interest of confidence-building and sta-
ble peace.
As many covert acts have a human rights dimension, they may be il-
legal under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
or regional human rights conventions. Intelligence agencies do not take
this aspect seriously enough. They often consider it sufficient to balance
human rights violations against the positive intelligence their agents
supply or will likely supply. Yet human rights instruments are of particu-
lar political and forensic significance. Extraordinary rendition for human
intelligence gathering is a case in point, as the forced transfer of people
for the purpose of conducting interrogation has often proven counterpro-
ductive and it frequently raises the concerns of human rights bodies, civil
society, states, and international organizations. 26 It must also be consid-
ered that intelligence objectives do not justify the derogation of human
rights. While it may be doubtful whether states involved in espionage
activities themselves could convincingly support a legal prohibition on
espionage by other states under the equitable principle of "clean hands,"
24. See Richard A. Falk, American Intervention in Cuba and the Rule of Law, 22 OHIO
ST. L.J. 546 (1961); Richard A. Falk, President Ford, CIA Covert Operations, and the Status
of International Law, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 354 (1975); Richard A. Falk, CIA Covert Action and
International Law, Soc'y, May-June 1975, at 39.
25. Johnson, supra note 10, at 302-308; Karl Doehring, Spionage im Friedensv6lkerrecht,
in VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ IN DER DEMOKRATIE: BEITRAGE AUS WISSENSCHAFT UND PRAXIS 307,
317-21 (Bundesamt fOr Verfassungsschutz ed., 1990).
26. See, e.g., Letter from Dick Many, Chairperson of the Comm. on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, to Antonio la Pergola, President
of the European Comm'n for Democracy Through Law (Dec. 15, 2005), included in Appendix
III, AS/Jur/2006(03)rev (Jan. 22, 2006), available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/
2006/20060124Jdoc032006_E.pdf (requesting a Legal Opinion on the legality of secret de-
tentions and rendition flights in the light of the member states' international legal obligations).
Rendition practices are dubious even for insiders. See John Radsan, A More Regular Process
for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2006).
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the situation is different in the case of human rights violations. Here, the
owner of the right is not the state but the individual victim, and the state
has an obligation to protect its citizens.
Special treaty regimes may contain specific restrictions for intelli-
gence gathering. In this context, disputed commitments on the use of
outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes,27 different interpretations
of the exact meaning of innocent passage through the territorial sea of a
foreign coastal state,28 and certain voluntary restrictions as part of re-
gional confidence- and security-building measures29 could provide
elements for further legal development. Where such specific restrictions
apply, they may be of continued relevance in the event of an armed con-
flict. In this respect, the current work of the International Law
Commission can be expected to offer new insight and widely acceptable
results,3' so that Articles 24 and 29 through 31 of the Hague Regulations
and Article 46 of Additional Protocol II may not be the last word for
regulating relevant activities in armed conflicts. This is of practical sig-
nificance for the application of human rights obligations of a state
conducting military operations in situations where it exercises jurisdic-
tion. It is particularly relevant for peace operations that include elements
of peace enforcement and must apply international humanitarian law.
II. ATTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
The completion and final adoption in 2001 of the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States32 has facili-
27. See DETLEV WOLTER, COMMON SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 14-17, 25-54 (2006).
28. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) art. 19(2)(c), Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; David H.N. Johnson, Innocent Passage, Transit Passage, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 994, 995-996 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
29. See Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Eur. (OSCE), Vienna Document 1992 of the
Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with
the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting on the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Mar. 4, 1992), available at http://
www.osce.org/documents/fsc/1992/03/4263en.pdf; VICTOR-YVEs GHEBALI & ALEXANDER
LAMBERT, THE OSCE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY:
ANATOMY AND IMPLEMENTATION (2005).
30. See Robert E. Hollweg, Military Reconnaissance, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 400, 403 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997).
31. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Memorandum by the Secretariat: The Effect of Armed Con-
flict on Treaties: an Examination of Practice and Doctrine, 160, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/550
(Feb. 1, 2005).
32. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, 1 76, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL
[Vol. 28:687
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tated the legal evaluation of actions of states. Although the Draft Articles
are not part of a law-making treaty, they have exerted considerable influ-
ence, and today jurisprudence and legal literature rightly use them as an
important reference document.
To establish state responsibility for certain acts of intelligence gath-
ering as internationally wrongful acts of a state, implicating the
international responsibility of that state, it is not enough to qualify such
actions as constituting a breach of an international legal obligation. The
action must also be attributable to the state under international law.33
Given the nature of covert action, this test may often fail. For instance,
the actor may not be identifiable as a state actor, as defined in Article 4
of the Draft Articles. The normal situation will involve rather informal
acts committed by de facto agents acting in the interest of the state.
As explained in the Commentary to the Draft Articles, the conduct
of private persons or entities is generally not attributable to a state under
international law.34 However, a specific factual relationship between a
person engaging in the conduct and the state exists "if the person ... is
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct."3 This requires a specific assess-
ment of the degree of control exercised by the state and its relationship
with the acting person in each particular case.
A. Effective Control
The ICJ showed in the Nicaragua case that the "direction or control"
test may be difficult to meet, as even general control by a state over a
force would not necessarily mean the state has directed or enforced the
acts in question. Without further evidence of specific instructions and
interference by the state, individuals not under the control of the state
could well be committing the acts. For this conduct to give rise to the
legal responsibility of the state, "it would in principle have to be proved
that the State had effective control of the military or paramilitary opera-
tions in the course of which the alleged violations were committed. 36
The Tadi6 decision37 by the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sounded a different
note on the issue of state control. After extensive discussion of the ICJ's
LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COM-
MENTARIES (2002).
33. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art. 2(a).
34. CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 110.
35. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art. 8.
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 65 (June 27).
37. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal on the Merits, V 99-145 (July 15,
1999).
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decision in Nicaragua, the Court accepted evidence of "overall control"
instead of "effective control" of insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(the Bosnian Serb Army) by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a suf-
ficient basis for qualifying the ongoing armed conflict as international.
Although the point of departure was the same as in Nicaragua, which
was to ascertain the conditions where international law considers an in-
dividual to be a de facto organ of another state, it is crucial to note that
the two judgments have served different purposes. The ICJ had to deter-
mine the international responsibility of the intervening state, whereas the
ICTY had to establish the necessary precondition for the "grave
breaches" regime of the Geneva Conventions to apply. Nevertheless, it
remains of general interest that the ICTY confirmed in Tadi6 that in or-
der to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to another
state, there must be proof that the state wields overall control over it, not
only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or
helping in the general planning of its military activity.38 The court held it
was no longer necessary that the state also has issued instructions for the
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.39 The Com-
mentary to the Draft Articles, after a short discussion of the two
judgments, refrains from drawing general conclusions on the exact
meaning of control, but indicates in a somehow sibylline manner "[t]hat
in any event it is a matter of appreciation in each case whether particular
conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such
an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it."4
While the term "control" and its exact requirements should not be
difficult to assess in the case of military and paramilitary operations, as
these are based on military leadership and command, the situation is
more complex in the case of intelligence activities, which require secret
planning and execution. In these cases, individual initiatives at the lowest
level play a much greater role, and "effective control" of the operation
within the terms of the Nicaragua judgment might be factually impossi-
ble to prove. Is the sending state then exempted from any possible
attribution of acts of intelligence gathering, or should a lower degree of
"overall control" suffice to invoke that state's responsibility? The Com-
mentary to the Draft Articles is silent on this issue, and relevant state
practice will hardly be put to test. Whether to expect jurisprudence in
this area is open to some doubt. It may depend on a change of govern-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 112. For further discussion, see Dieter Fleck, Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law After September 11: Challenges and the Need to Respond, 6 YB.
INT'L. HUMANITARIAN L. 41,44-45 (2006).
[Vol. 28:687
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ment in some cases. Even if the act of state doctrine4 is not applicable
without restrictions, individuals affected by acts of intelligence will
often hesitate to take the risk of suing a state, and the latter normally will
prefer to settle the case outside public procedures.
In rare cases conduct of individuals is attributable to a state "if and
to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in ques-
tion as its own., 43 As explained in the Commentary, this language
excludes cases of "mere support or endorsement,"44 and thus it remains
an open question whether international law considers financing or factu-
ally exploiting such acts as acknowledgement or formal adoption. States
normally prefer to profit from intelligence operations without disclosing
any form of participation. Attributability, however, can hardly be dis-
puted where an act is planned and executed on the basis of distinct
policy directives, such as domestic law enforcement powers to better
pursue a terrorist target, and the execution of the act is funded from the
state's budget.
B. De Facto Agents
In practice it may be even more difficult to decide whether certain
instructions or the direction or control under which a person or group of
persons were carrying out their conduct were "in fact" those of a state
within the meaning of Article 8 of the Draft Articles. In this respect, the
Commentary refers to "a specific factual relationship between the person
or entity engaging in the conduct and the State" in terms of "the exis-
tence of a real link between the person or group performing the act and
the State machinery, 45 but it does not offer further elements for delibera-
tion.
While problems arising in this respect mostly depend on the factual
difficulty of establishing such links in a given situation, it is worth consid-
ering the more general issue of parallel interests of such agents and a state.
This issue might lead to a congruent impetus for the performance of the
act in question. In the Tadi6 case, acts imputed to the Federal Republic of
41. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("[Tlhe courts in one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own terri-
tory.").
42. See, e.g., J.-P. Fonteyne, Acts of State, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 17 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992); ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA,
UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT, 775-76 (3d ed. 1984); Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Rec-
ollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); Michael Singer, The Act of
State Doctrine of the United Kingdom: An Analysis with Comparisons to United States Prac-
tice, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 283 (1981).
43. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art. 11.
44. CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 122.
45. Id. at 110.
Spring 2007]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Yugoslavia were likewise serving the interests of the people fighting for
Republika Srpska. The militant students in the Teheran Hostages case
expressly claimed to act on their own behalf rather than on behalf of the
Iranian authorities. As a general principle, state responsibility for de
facto agents should not be denied where there is convincing proof of in-
structions given or direction or control exercised on behalf of a state
which has led to or facilitated the act performed.46
III. CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS
OF SPECIFIC ACTS
Various circumstances may preclude the wrongfulness of acts of in-
telligence gathering in current legal doctrine. For instance, states might
claim that another state or individual claimant validly consented to an
act; they may argue that the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-
defense; they might claim to have taken a lawful countermeasure; or they
might invoke necessity. The principle that acts not in conformity with
peremptory norms (jus cogens) are wrongful in any event47 does not
make such circumstances irrelevant, as intelligence gathering is not per
se a violation of international humanitarian law or other norms of jus
cogens.
A. Consent
Valid consent by a state precludes the wrongfulness of the act in
question.4 ' An authorized organ of the target state must give consent be-
fore the act. But consent given retrospectively, after the conduct has
occurred, may also lead to a loss of that state's right to invoke responsi-
bility, if the injured state has validly waived or acquiesced in the lapse of
the claim.49 This may be relevant in considering relationships between
governments in which national interests and support from one side com-
bine with intelligence-gathering activities of the other side's institutions,
binding them together.
The Draft Articles make no mention of consent by individual claim-
ants, but the Commentary confirms that international law may also have
46. See Gregory Townsend, State Responsibility for Acts of De Facto Agents, 14 ARIz.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 635 (1997); Claus KreB, L'organe de facto en droit international public.
Rdflexions sur l'imputation a l'tat de l'acte d'un particulier 6 la lumi~re des ddveloppements
ricents, in 52 REVUE GtNERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 93 (2001); JORN GRIE-
BEL, DIE ZURECHNUNGSKATEGORIE DER DE FACTO-ORGANE IM RECHT DER STAATENVERANT-
WORTLICHKEIT (2004).
47. Draft Articles, supra note 32, arts. 26, 50(1)(d).
48. Id. art. 20.
49. Id. art. 45.
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to take into account such individual consent. In this context the Com-
mentary makes the particularly relevant remark that although
beneficiaries of human rights treaties cannot waive those rights, "the in-
dividual's free consent may be relevant to their application."5 ° This again
shows the complexity of invoking state responsibility for acts of intelli-
gence gathering. For instance, states could have pressed informants to
cooperate in order to avoid severe disadvantages or even personal harm.
Investigations and control mechanisms may be difficult to implement
and often unsuccessful.
B. Self-Defense
A claim of self-defense as a justification for intelligence activities
may preclude the wrongfulness of such activities, provided the self-
defense was lawful and in conformity with the UN Charter." In recent
practice, actors have abused the notion of self-defense, thus creating an
area of controversy. Furthermore, the argument of self-defense is un-
available with respect to certain obligations, as rightly confirmed in the
Commentary. 2 For instance, all parties to an armed conflict must comply
with international humanitarian law and human rights obligations under
all circumstances. Intelligence gathering will be wrongful when states
conduct it in breach of such provisions.
C. Countermeasures
Victims of an internationally wrongful act53 may declare intelligence
activities to be countermeasures or "reprisals" against the offending
state. In such cases, again, states cannot waive fundamental rules of hu-
man rights and humanitarian protection. As international law prohibits
reprisals against persons protected under the law of armed conflict, and
also outlaws them in peacetime international relations,54 there will be
little room to preclude the wrongfulness of an act under this argument.
D. Necessity
A state may invoke necessity as a ground for precluding the wrong-
fulness of an act only under extreme circumstances. The act must be the
only means for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril, and it may not seriously impair the essential and
50. CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 165.
51. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art. 21.
52. CRAWFORD, supra note 32, 166.
53. Draft Articles, supra note 32, arts. 22, 49-54.
54. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 18.
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lawful interests of other states.55 Furthermore, some international obliga-
tions exclude the possibility of invoking necessity altogether. This may
be the case under international humanitarian law, where only exceptional
rules expressly provide for such possibility, whereas the law of armed
conflict generally balances military necessity with the requirements of
humanity. Also, a state cannot invoke necessity if it has contributed to
the situation that gave rise to the claim in the first instance.
After September 11, states stretched the concept of necessity to jus-
tify doubtful means of investigation in a number of cases. 6 In the United
States, the Joint Resolution of Congress of September 14, 2001" paved
the way for foreign military operations that go far beyond law enforce-
ment with the consent of the receiving state and that under the norms of
international law clearly require a state of armed conflict. Similar cases
in the past include President Ronald Reagan's decision in 1986 to bomb
Muammar Qaddafi's residence in Libya in response to a terrorist attack
that killed several U.S. soldiers in a Berlin discotheque and President
Bill Clinton's decision in 1998 to use cruise missiles against a pharma-
ceutical factory in Sudan in response to terrorist attacks on the U.S.
embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. After September 11, for acts
committed outside the scope of military operations in armed conflict, the
United States considered58 amending Executive Order 12,333, which
prohibits direct and indirect participation in assassination by the U.S.
government and its employees,59 although it did not formally pursue this
option. In an effort to increase its capacity to gather intelligence on ter-
rorists, the United States lowered existing limitations on the recruitment
of spies with suspicious or criminal backgrounds for intelligence opera-
tions. It also reconsidered the traditional exclusion of journalists,'
clergymen, academics, and Peace Corps and USAID workers from such
recruitment. While such developments often failed to provide convincing
55. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art. 25.
56. See Frederick P. Hitz, Unleashing the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and Letting
the CIA be the CIA, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 765 (2002); HEYMANN, supra note 12, at 61-
84, 133-57; Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond the "War" on Terrorism: Towards
the New Intelligence Network, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1446, 1463-81 (2005).
57. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001).
58. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination:
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667 (2003); see also HCJ 769/02 Pub.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel and Palestinian Soc'y for the Prot. of Human Rights and the
Env't v. Israel et al. [2006] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/
02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
59. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
60. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293,
§ 309, 110 Stat. 3461, 3467 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-07).
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examples of success in the fight against terrorism, they may have invited
intelligence services in other countries to introduce even less scrupulous
methods.6'
There are better examples of state activities that may serve as a
model for other states in the fight against terrorism. As early as 1992,
Germany introduced Section 98 into its Criminal Procedure Code, 62 al-
lowing computerized comparison of personal data on presumed
characteristics of perpetrators with other data in order to exclude indi-
viduals not under suspicion or to identify individuals who meet other
characteristics significant to the investigations. This professional data
mining has proven highly effective. The law strictly limits the process to
prosecution of certain severe crimes, it respects fundamental rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution, and it convincingly excludes the use of
collected personal data for any other purpose. Germany recently went
further with the new Law to Establish Common Data of Police and Intel-
ligence Agencies of the Federation and the States.63 It facilitates the use
of existing data for the prosecution of severe crimes and defines obliga-
tions of intelligence agencies to cooperate with the police in the fight
against international terrorism. Marking the limits of lawful data mining,
the Federal Court of Justice decided on January 31, 2007 that covert
online search activities in personal computers would require authoriza-
tion by a legislative act which so far is not available at the federal level.
64
E. Sovereign Immunity
Even beyond the exemptions expressly enumerated in the Draft Arti-
cles on the Responsibility of States, states might also refer to specific
61. See ANDREAS VON BULOW, IM NAMEN DES STAATES. CIA, BND UND DIE
KRIMINELLEN MACHENSCHAFTEN DER GEHEIMDIENSTE (1998); ANDREAS VON BULOW, DIE
CIA UND DER 11 SEPTEMBER. INTERNATIONALER TERROR UND DIE ROLLE DER
GEHEIMDTENSTE (2004); STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE. THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA
TORTURE PROGRAM (2006).
62. Strafprozelordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Sept. 12, 1950, BGBI.
1950 at 455, 512, 629, as amended by Gesetz zur Bekampfung des illegalen
Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalitait [OrgKG]
[Law to Combat Illegal Drug Trafficking and Other Forms of Organized Crime], July 15,
1992, BGB1. I at 1302, art. 3, § 3 (ER.G.), available at http://dejure.org/gesetze/StPO/
98a.html.
63. Gesetz zur Errichtung Gemeinsamer Dateien von Polizeibeh6rden und
Nachrichtendiensten des Bundes und der Lnder [Gemeinsame-Dateien-Gesetz] [Law to
Establish Common Data of Police and Intelligence Agencies of the Federation and the
Lander], Dec. 30, 2006, BGB1. I at 3409, available at http://www.bgblportal.de/BGBL/
bgbl1 f/bgbl 06s3409.pdf.
64. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan 31, 2007, StB 18/06
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norms, such as sovereign immunity, functional immunity of personnel,
and immunities of warships and other government ships in attempts to
justify intelligence activities. Yet the relevance of these principles to per-
sons and objects involved in covert action is not always clear. A "foreign
State need not be granted immunity with regard to objects it had brought
into the forum State in violation of the forum State's territorial sover-
eignty (e.g. warships entering territorial seas in violation of international
law or instruments of espionage). 65 States must respect the sovereign
rights of receiving states and transit states. 66 Under international law, no
state can rely on an "intelligence exception., 67 Furthermore, specific re-
strictions may apply to flights over foreign territory and even the high
68seas.
IV. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF SPIES
The criminal prosecution of spies is predominantly a matter of na-
tional law of the affected state. While espionage is not an international
crime, most national legal systems provide for the prosecution and pun-
ishment of treason and espionage, without making much distinction
between acts committed in wartime or in peacetime. The same applies to
crimes committed in connection with espionage, such as violation of
human rights, bribery, robbery, drug trafficking, illegal weapons prolif-
eration, and intrusion on protected data. Many states even penalize the
collection of unclassified national security information, when done in a
covert manner, as this may fulfill the elements of espionage under the
law of the state spied upon. States often do not insist on punishment of
particular perpetrators but instead expel or exchange them for intelli-
gence personnel they have employed themselves.
65. Helmut Steinberger, State Immunity, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 615, 630 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) (referring to Articles 32, 95, and
96 of UNCLOS); see also J6rg Manfred M6ssner, Spionage und Immunitat von
Kriegsschiffen, 35 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1196 (1982).
66. Council of Europe-European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice
Commission), Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member
States in Respect of Secret Detentions Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, 66th
plen. sess., CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 17-18, 2006), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/
docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.pdf.
67. Anthony Dworkin, The CIA Exception: Can Intelligence Agents Subject Detainees
to Inhuman and Degrading Treatment?, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Feb. 2, 2005, http://
www.crimesofwar.org/news-CIA.html.




A. International Legal Aspects
Although the field of national security provides the main reasons for
criminalizing acts of espionage, international considerations affect
prosecution and court procedures as well. Principles and provisions of
international law require penal sanctions in the case of gross human
rights violations and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Am-
nesty International has called for the prosecution of anyone suspected of
having committed, ordered, or authorized rendition or any other human
rights violations connected to such practice, including forced disappear-
ance, torture, or ill-treatment. 69 Amnesty also has urged states that they
must conduct all prosecutions in proceedings which meet international
standards of fairness. Amnesty convincingly maintains that states should
impose sentences that are commensurate with the gravity of the crime,
but without recourse to the death penalty. It must, indeed, be deplored
that perpetrators of such crimes still enjoy impunity in many states and
that national criminal procedures are not always in line with interna-
tional legal requirements.
70
B. The German Experience
Legal cases concerning the prosecution of spies after the German
unification extensively considered international legal aspects of espio-
nage. During the 1990 negotiations between East and West Germany, the
two states could not reach an agreement on a possible amnesty for mem-
bers of the former East German secret service (the Stasi). Many people
in both parts of the country opposed any sign of conciliation with this
particular organization. The German Unification Treaty7' provides that
for the prosecution of crimes committed prior to unification, the law of
the Federal Republic would apply. This led to the continued prosecution
of espionage committed in favor of the former German Democratic Re-
public, irrespective of whether the permanent residence of the
69. Amnesty Int'l, The Secretive and Illegal US Programme of "Rendition", http://
web.amnesty.org/pages/stoptorture-050406-feature-eng.
70. A temporary committee of the European Parliament issued a report that suggests
that a number of EU governments knew of the U.S. detention program. See Report of the
Temp. Comm. on the Alleged Use of Eur. Countries by the CIA for the Transp. and Illegal
Det. of Prisoners, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (2007), available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/tdip/final-report-en.pdf.
71. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik fiber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschland vom 31. August
1990-Einigungsvertrag-(Anlage I, Kapitel III, Sachgebiet C, Abschnitt II Nr. lb) [Treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the
Establishment of German Unity (Unification Treaty)], Aug. 31, 1990, BGBI. 11 at 885,
reprinted in PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDES14EGIERUNG, translated in THE
UNIFICATION OF GERMANY IN 1990, A DOCUMENTATION (1991).
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perpetrator was in East or West Germany. Further attempts within the
German Bundestag (Federal Diet) in 1990 and 1993 to introduce an am-
nesty for members of the Stasi were unsuccessful.
German criminal courts dealt extensively with this situation and ex-
amined it under various viewpoints. Under Article 25 of the German
Constitution, the general rules of international law are an integral part
of the federal law, taking precedence over domestic laws and directly
creating rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.
Thus, German courts have to interpret and apply relevant rules of inter-
national law. If, in the course of litigation, doubt exists whether a rule of
international law is an integral part of federal law and whether it directly
creates rights and duties for the individual, the court must obtain a deci-
sion from the Federal Constitutional Court under Article 100(2) of the
German Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed in
1995 that there is no general rule of international law that precludes
prosecution for intelligence operations committed on behalf of and from
the territory of a state which subsequently, in a peaceful and negotiated
71process, accedes to the state spied upon.
The Federal Constitutional Court stated in this case that international
law does not prohibit or limit prosecution for peacetime espionage under
national law. It noted that spies so prosecuted cannot claim immunity,
unless they fall within the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, 4 the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, 75 or other special conventions. The Court further noted that so far,
no state had invoked the act of state doctrine with respect to espionage
activities, and, as this doctrine is confined to the Anglo-American legal
tradition, courts could not regard it as a general rule within the meaning
of the German Constitution. The Court also considered that no general
72. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 25, as amended by Gesetz zur Anderung des
Grundgesetzes [Act to Amend the Basic Law], Dec. 20, 1993, BGBl. I at 2089 (F.R.G.), trans-
lation available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm.
73. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 15, 1995,
92 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 277 (328) (ER.G.), in 48 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1811 (1995). See John Miller, Settling Accounts with a Secret
Police: The German Law on the Stasi Records, 50 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 305 (1998); Jochen A.
Frowein, Ruidiger Wolfrum & Gunnar Schuster, Volkerrechtliche Fragen der Strafbarkeit von
Spionen aus der ehemaligen DDR, 121 BEITRAGE ZUM AUSLANDISCHEN OFFENTLICHEN
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT (1995); Gunnar Schuster, Verfassungs- und volkerrechtliche
Fragen der Bestrafung von DDR-Spionen nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, 51
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT [ZabRV] 651
(1991).
74. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 29, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.




rule of international law concerned the treatment of those who commit-
ted treason or performed covert operations for another state that later
acceded to the state spied upon. The law of state succession did not fol-
low general rules, and due to the absence of general state practice, the
Court said it could not draw an analogy to Article 31 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 6 as this
provision was part of the law of war, not of peacetime law, and state
practice did not support such an analogy. Finally, the Court explained
that prosecution in this case would not contravene the principle of nulla
poena sine lege, enshrined in Article 15 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and Article 7 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, as that rule did not require that an action be punishable
under the law of the state of the offender. However, there was a limita-
tion under the principle of proportionality for the prosecution of acts of
espionage directed against the Federal Republic that were committed on
the territory of the former German Democratic Republic or its allies.
Such acts could not be prosecuted, as both states had agreed in the Basic
Treaty of 1972"7 to accept the principle that the jurisdiction of each is
limited to its own territory.
This judgment was the subject of vigorous debate, even within the
Federal Constitutional Court. Three of the eight judges sitting on the
case joined in a dissenting opinion, stating that the Court misinterpreted
the principle of proportionality by neglecting severe and continuing
damage by spies to the security of the Federal Republic and its institu-
tions.7" They also criticized the judgment for honoring the confidence of
spies in the continued existence of their state, a confidence that did not
deserve legal protection. They argued that the Court used political con-
siderations in lieu of legal arguments, and the judgment resulted in an
unacceptable preference for perpetrators who remained on the territory
of the former German Democratic Republic as opposed to spies sent to
the Federal Republic. Deterring perpetrators from continuing their acts
against the Federal Republic in the service of another state required
criminal prosecution. While only the legislature had the power to grant a
general amnesty, which it had so far refrained from doing, criminal
courts appropriately had considered extenuating circumstances, which
might lead to milder punishments or impunity in individual cases.
76. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 15, 2005,
92 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 277 (315) (F.R.G.).
77. Vertrag vom 21. Dezember 1972 Ober die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [Basic Treaty
of 1972], June 6, 1973, BGBI. II at 421, art. 6, available at http://www.bundestag.de/
geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok07.html.
78. BVerfGE 92, 277 (328) (Klein, J., Kirchhof, J., & Winter, J., dissenting).
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Others have taken similarly critical positions against the judgment.
One scholar argued that given the continued need for criminalizing espio-
nage directed against the Federal Republic, an amnesty could not serve
any meaningful purpose.7' The Bundestag has not taken up the amnesty
issue again. The European Court of Human Rights, concerned about the
length of relevant proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court in
the case of two other applicants, decided in 2000 that Germany had not
violated Article 6, Section 1 of the Convention (the right to a fair trial
within reasonable time)."
Thus, the application of principles and provisions of international
law has resulted in the impunity of a small group of spies of the former
German Democratic Republic, namely those acting on the territory of
the German Democratic Republic or its allies, while those acting on the
territory of the Federal Republic were prosecuted. Yet the relevance of
this jurisprudence for future cases will be very limited.
V. REPARATIONS FOR WRONGFUL ACTS
OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
In addition to prosecution of individual perpetrators for treason and
espionage under national criminal law, courts may hold states account-
able for espionage not only to the target state, but also to individual
victims. Where actors commit wrongful acts on behalf of states, justice
requires that states must face their responsibility.8 Victims may also di-
rect their claims against individual perpetrators, but in most cases
individuals will be unable to make full reparation, in particular during or
after criminal prosecution.
While recent legal developments and political events have led to a
revolution in accountability of states for wrongful acts,82 the extent to
79. Karl Doehring, Zur Ratio der Spionenbestrafung - Volkerrecht und nationales
Recht, in ZEITSCHRIFT FU)R RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 293 (1995).
80. Gast & Popp v. Germany, 2000-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 487.
81. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art 27(b).
82. See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past
Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301 (2003). Also, the International Law Association has
recently established a new Committee on Compensation for Victims of War (chair: Dr. Luke T.
Lee, American Branch; rapporteurs: Professor Rainer Hofmann, German Branch, and Profes-
sor Shuichi Furuya, Japanese Branch). The mandate is as follows:
Innocent civilians are often casualties during armed conflicts, whether or not inten-
tionally targeted. Deprived of effective protection, they are often left without any
remedy if they are killed or wounded, or suffer property or other losses. It is time to
systematically review the law of war and human rights with a view to focusing on
the rights of victims of war to compensation-both to serve the end of justice and
to inhibit wanton attack on civilian population by the military, whether or not under
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which this relates to intelligence-gathering activities is uncertain. One
might view the accountability of a state for intelligence-gathering activi-
ties committed on its behalf as a result of the prosecutions of individual
actors. But state responsibility does not end with crimes committed by
its agents. Rather, it applies to all wrongful acts of the state, including
acts that are illegal under international law, even if national law does not
criminalize them. Whereas the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
States exclude acts committed by state agents in their capacity as private
individuals,83 Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 and Ar-
ticle 91 of Additional Protocol I cover acts committed by persons who
form part of the armed forces in times of war, which gives these latter
rules the character of lex specialis.
As we have seen above, intelligence activities as such may not be
wrongful under present international law, but the wrongfulness may de-
rive from additional conditions, such as illegal intervention, breach of
foreign sovereignty, or common crimes committed in the course of es-
pionage acts.85 Decisionmakers must consider all wrongful acts when
remedies are at issue. Thus, it is appropriate that Amnesty International
has demanded that judicial or other mechanisms guarantee full repara-
tion to the victims of rendition or any other human rights violations
connected to such practice, including forced disappearance, torture, or ill
treatment.
86
Current international law imposes no obligation to make reparations,
except for internationally wrongful acts. This may be a problem in cases
in which acts of intelligence gathering that are not lawful per se have
caused "collateral" damage that may include severe losses in individual
cases. As a matter of sound policy, states should include such losses in
their efforts to make full reparation. In this context, it is clear that states
superior order. The proposed project would have as its goal the preparation and
adoption of a Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on Compensation to
Victims of War, as a logical sequel to three ILA declarations already adopted:
namely, on Mass Expulsion (Seoul 1986), Compensation to Refugees (Cairo 1992),
and Internally Displaced Persons (London 2000). Underlying all these declarations
is the principle that compensation must, under international law, be paid to victims
of human rights abuses.
Committee News, ILA Newsl. No. 18, 2003, at 6, http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Newsletter/
ILA%2ONewslettr%2018.pdf. See also RAINER HOFMANN & FRANK REIMANN, INT'L LAW
ASS'N, COMM. ON COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WAR, COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
WAR: BACKGROUND REPORT (2003), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Compensation%
20for%20Victims%
20of%2OWar/Background%20ReportAugust2004.pdf.
83. Draft Articles, supra note 32, art. 7.
84. Id. art. 55.
85. Supra text accompanying note 25.
86. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 69.
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are accountable for intelligence gathering not only to the target state, but
also to individual victims, and not the least to agents they deploy. This
observation was made decades ago,87 and it is still of importance. Forms of
reparation include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction,
and guarantees of nonrepetition. If the case demands, the offender must
pay compensation."
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The question of whether and to what extent intelligence-gathering
activities are wrongful per se remains ambivalent in international law.
International law clearly prohibits intelligence gathering if coupled with
additional elements, such as illegal intervention, breach of foreign sover-
eignty, or common crimes. Politicians committing or authorizing such
wrongful acts must face individual and state responsibility, and democ-
ratic constituencies must remind them of this responsibility, if the rule of
law is to remain meaningful. Further limits on peacetime espionage
could derive from the legal principles of confidence building and good
cooperation between states, but such limits are still undeveloped. Draw-
ing a bright line for intelligence operations is difficult even under the law
of armed conflict, which protects spies in a limited way. Yet prohibitions
on certain acts in peacetime may be of continued relevance in wartime-
a prospect that deserves further exploration.
Those involved should make further efforts to increase cooperation
between relevant services in the interest of effective results and profes-
sional intelligence evaluation. States should foster civil-military
cooperation to make intelligence products available wherever they are
needed for good governance, assist courts and prosecutors, and improve
legislative oversight.
The attribution of acts of intelligence gathering to a state largely de-
pends on the control that state exercises. While it may be disputed
whether detailed and effective control is essential for this purpose, the
requirement appears to be fulfilled where states plan, execute, and fund
an act on the basis of distinct policy directives, such as domestic law
enforcement powers to better pursue a terrorist target.
While some circumstances may preclude the wrongfulness of a spe-
cific act of intelligence gathering under international law, violations of
human rights or international humanitarian law do in any case constitute
wrongful acts. In certain situations, the principle of necessity justifies
87. Leslie S. Edmondson, Espionage in Transnational Law, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
434, 435 (1972).
88. See G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006).
[Vol. 28:687
Intelligence Gathering
data mining and cooperation between intelligence and police agencies in
the use of personal data for the prosecution of severe crimes.
International law does not influence criminal responsibility in every
respect, as national law may provide punishment even for the collection
of unclassified information, when done in a covert manner on foreign
territory in a way that fulfills the elements of the crime of espionage un-
der the law of the state spied upon. Yet principles and provisions of
international law require penal sanctions in the case of gross human
rights violations and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. In the
special situation of the German unification in 1990, international legal
issues were extensively considered in proceedings against spies of the
former German Democratic Republic. Yet the consequences of this juris-
prudence for future cases may be limited.
As individuals will generally be unable to make full reparation to vic-
tims of intelligence gathering, state responsibility is most important for the
victims of wrongful acts. State responsibility goes beyond criminal action
and applies to all wrongful acts of a state. As a matter of sound policy,
states should make reparations to individuals for "collateral" damage as
well, and the rule of law cannot recognize any "intelligence exception."
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